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Petersen: Board of Curators v. Horowitz

BOARD OF CURATORS V. HOROWITZ
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Procedural Due Process-Dismissalsfrom
public educational institutionsfor academic as opposed to disciplinary reasons do not mandate a hearing before the school's decisionmaking body. 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).

Charlotte Horowitz, a student at the University of MissouriKansas City, brought a civil rights action challenging her dismissal
from the medical school.' The federal district court dismissed the
action in an unreported opinion, and Horowitz appealed.2 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Horowitz v. Board
of Curators3 that a student has a liberty interest 4 in completing her
education and therefore may not be deprived of that interest without due process. 5 Hearing the case on certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling. 6
Before examining the Horowitz case, it is helpful to discuss
previous rulings in the area of procedural due process guarantees
as applied to students at public educational institutions. Constitutional safeguards against capricious suspension or dismissal extend
only to those actions attributable to the state 7 and are unavailable
1. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Horowitz v. Board of
Curators, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978). Section 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The right to maintain a suit in equity or at law to restrain
state officials from infringing upon a person's constitutional rights is given by Congress to every person within the jurisdiction of the United States. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939).
2. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, No. 74CV47-W-3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 1975),
rev'd, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
3. 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
4. Id. at 1321.
5. See id.
6. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
7. Only deprivations of property which are a result of "state action" mandate
fourteenth amendment due process protection. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972). Federal courts have interpreted "property" to include the right to at-
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to students at private universities. 8 During the last decade there
have been a number of important court decisions which deal with
the extent to which students at public schools and colleges are entitled to procedural due process before they may be suspended or
expelled. 9 The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process10
has been judicially extended to encompass public university disciplinary proceedings."- There is general agreement that fundamentend college or to be free from arbitrary and illegal expulsions. See, e.g., Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)
(establishing that publicly supported state universities are within purview of state
action doctrine).
8. The actions of universities neither administered nor funded by the state have
been held not to be state action. See Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.
1974); Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598 (D.S.C. 1970). Cf. Coleman v.
Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (expelled students at private college
held entitled to hearing at which they could prove state statute regarding all colleges
in state represented state action).
9. See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (due process requires
hearing and apprisal of charges pending, although counsel is not required); Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)
(student is entitled to hearing with notice and statement of charges before disciplinary action of dismissal may be taken; such hearing should include right of crossexamination and access to testimony against student); Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326
F. Supp. 1200 (D. Kan. 1971) (suspension reversed pending hearing with adequate
notice, knowledge of charges, opportunity to defend, and substantial evidence to
support decision); Bistrick v. University of S.C., 324 F. Supp. 942 (D.S.C. 1971) (due
process requirements at state schools are met by fair hearing, including notice to
student of specific grounds or charge, names of adverse witnesses, and opportunity
for student to present evidence on his own behalf); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702
(W.D. Wis. 1969) (school board may not forbid male high school students from wearing long hair); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968) (students in disciplinary proceedings are entitled to notice, knowledge of adverse testimony, and opportunity to defend themselves).
10. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The protection afforded by this clause expands
with jurisprudential attitudes of fundamental fairness. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972). Procedural due process, as opposed to substantive due process, requires
that notice and the right to a fair hearing be given if the government seeks to deprive
a person of his liberty or property. Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Substantive
due process requires that all legislation must be reasonably related to a valid governmental objective. See Williams v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 480, 14 S.E.2d
287, 291 (1941). The nature of the procedures due process requires varies according to
the factual context. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
11. For cases illustrating the reasons students have been summarily dismissed
or suspended, see Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) (student expelled under guise of catalog regulation for protesting amount of his graduate
fellowship); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (student
suspended under in loco parentis doctrine for raucous behavior); Robinson v. Uni-
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tal safeguards are required in every school disciplinary proceeding
that may lead to a serious penalty:' 2 The student is guaranteed
notice in writing of the specific charges against him and must be
informed of the nature of the evidence against him. 13 A hearing
must be held at which the student may give explanations and present evidence in his own defense. 14 If there is a decision to take
disciplinary action, it must be supported by substantial evidence.15
First, the trend of the lower federal court and Supreme Court
decisions in the area of procedural due process for students at public universities will be considered.' 6 In addition, this comment will
explore the academic/disciplinary dichotomy in decisions in this
area. 1 7 In recent years, there have been several important rulings
in this field.' 8 However, fourteenth amendment due process pro-

versity of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (student dismissed from

required student teaching post because he was "fanatical atheist"); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928) (student dismissed
based on vague rumors of bad conduct and on not being a "typical Syracuse girl");
Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1st Dep't 1902) (student dismissed from law school for writing to woman in class).
12. See, e.g., Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); see also
cases cited note 9 supra. "Serious penalty" refers to an expulsion or suspension from a
public school.
13. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Evidence upon which the
specific charges against the student are based is to be made known to the accused.
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
14. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
15. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Jones v. State Bd. of
Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
16. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Supreme Court addressed this
issue for the first time. The Court held that a student faced with suspension from
public school for more than a "trivial period," id. at 576, must be given notice of the
charges, an explanation of the evidence against him, and an opportunity to be heard
in his defense. Id. at 581. It should be noted that this comment will not consider the
applicability of principles of "state action" to private universities. Constitutional protections are, in general, directed as a limitation on governmental action. The fourteenth amendment is directed, more specifically, to the states. Many large universities are private, however, and thus are arguably beyond the reach of many constitutional guarantees.
17. Regarding disciplinary dismissals, courts have shown a willingness to impose strict due process standards for the university student. See, e.g., Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961). However, courts have consistently refused to impose similar requirements
regarding academic dismissals. See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1976); Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
18. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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tection as it applies to public university students is still relatively
new to the courts.1 9
LEGAL BACKGROUND TO

Horowitz

Considerable judicial attention has been paid to the methods
employed by public school authorities in suspension or expulsion of
students. This interest can best be understood by reviewing the
two-pronged development of due process protection in disciplinary
proceedings and in academic dismissals. Until recently, courts have
allowed public school authorities wide discretion in disciplining
students. 20 For example, a school could, as a disciplinary measure,
dismiss a student without a hearing. 2 1 To support school authorities
in their use of discretion, the courts have relied on the in loco
parentis doctrine 22 and the interpretation of the student-university
23
relationship according to contract law.
The in loco parentis doctrine has provided a basis for allowing
school authorities to expel students without a hearing. 24 Under the
doctrine of in loco parentis-inthe place of a parent-the school is
regarded as a surrogate parent, assuming and discharging parental
duties. The assumption underlying the doctrine is that a parent
19. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978). Horowltz
exemplifies the problem both school authorities and courts confront in determining
whether a dismissal is disciplinary or academic. The term disciplinary refers to action taken by the school authorities against a student because his conduct, as opposed to his academic performance, has failed to conform to a school standard. However, the line between a disciplinary dismissal and an academic one is not always
clear, as indicated by Horowitz. Although courts often deal with disciplinary and
academic dismissals or suspensions as discrete entities, often it is not easy for them
to distinguish between these categories.
20. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
Vermillion v. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907); Anthony v. Syracuse
Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928).
21. See John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Vermillion v. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
22. As Blackstone described this doctrine:
[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that
of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for
which he is employed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 453. See generally Buss, ProceduralDue Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
545, 559-62 (1971).
23. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928).
24. See Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Vermillion v.
Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
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would not be required to give "notice" or arrange for an "opportunity to be heard" before a child could be punished: Therefore, a
school, as a parent, could act without procedural constraints in disciplining its students. However, the doctrine did not provide a
blanket justification for unbridled discretion in disciplinary matters.2 5 For example, if it were clear that the administrator had
abused his discretion, a student could recover in tort for, among
other things, assault and battery. 2 6 However, to recover, the student had to demonstrate that the teacher acted unreasonably, that
is, maliciously 27 or inordinately punitively. 2 8 In the last decade, the
29
in loco parentis doctrine has fallen into disfavor with the courts.
The devitalization of this doctrine in the last few years may be attributed in part to the changing social climate of the '60's and the
concurrent recognition that students, as well as other groups in
society, are entitled to certain rights. 30 Courts began to realize the
25.

More specifically, while a teacher could spank a student to discipline him,

he did not have authority to "inflict some permanent injury" on the student. In addition, the teacher was not to act with "malice or wicked motives" when disciplining a
student. Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954).
26. See Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904). In an
action against the city for wrongful exclusion of plaintiff from school, the court held
that whether or not the school had acted in good faith in excluding plaintiff was to
be submitted to the jury.
27. Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954). This case involved an
action to recover damages for assault and battery allegedly committed by a school
teacher in administering corporal punishment to a pupil. Since the evidence showed
no permanent injury was inflicted upon the plaintiff, and the teacher had not acted
unreasonably, that is, with "malice or wicked motives" towards the plaintiff, the
court held for defendant-teacher. Id. at 450, 71 So. 2d at 50.
28. See Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944). In this case,
an action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from an assault by defendant-teacher. The teacher was found to have administered "unreasonable force" in disciplining plaintiff. He had dragged plaintiff to the
floor and was kneeling and sitting upon him, exerting his weight on plaintiff's
stomach. Id. at 575, 36 A.2d at 378. In reaching its determination that inordinate
punishment had been perpetrated by the teacher, the court considered the nature of
the student's offense, the student's motive in being disobedient, the influence of his
example and conduct upon others, and the sex, size, age, and strength of the pupil
punished. Id. at 577, 36 A.2d at 379. See also Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268
(1890); Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala. App. 574, 28 So. 2d 422 (1946); Roberson v. State,
22 Ala. App. 413, 116 So. 317 (1928); Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 A. 841
(1885).
29. See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 756 (W.D. La.
1968). See also Note, An Overview: The Private University and Due Process, 1970
DuKE L.J. 795.
30. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court in Gault noted: "Unbridled discre-
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potentially unlimited disciplinary power that could be exercised
under the guise of the in loco parentis doctrine. It became apparent that this doctrine had been used by the courts as a stopgap
measure in lieu of careful examination of what, if any, due process
protection is owed to students. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed in loco parentis, although similar theories of total
institutional authority, such as the parens patrie doctrine, have
been questioned. 3 '
Another major judicial theory which the courts have used in
dealing with claims of due process protection of university students
is based on contract law. According to this theory, a contractual
relationship is established between a student and a college or university when he is enrolled. The contract requires that the student
follow the school's disciplinary rules and regulations. 3 2 This theory
further suggests that the student has consented to forego his right
to due process in the application of these rules. 33 Specifically, if
the school's regulations grant the dean power to expel a student
summarily for a number of offenses, the student is bound by these
4
terms and may be dismissed without a hearing.3
These theories, in loco parentis and student-university relationship as contract, were bases for the judicial reluctance to intervene in what was assumed a state educational function.3 5 This
nonintervention position of the federal courts, however, did not
tion . .. is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." Id. at 18. The
Court went on to observe: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy

does not justify a kangeroo court." Id. at 28. See also Buss, Procedural Due Process
for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545
(1971); Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
31. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
32. See, e.g., Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S.
202 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1st Dep't 1917).
33. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't
1928).
34. The court in Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., id., found a regulation in the college's registration form which stated that students could be suspended at the administration's discretion. The court held this to be a contract, terminable at will by the
college. A similar line of reasoning was proffered in Barker v. Bryn Mawr College,
278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923), to uphold a summary dismissal. The rationale of
Barker controlled in Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957).
The courts were, however, willing to impose minimal standards of good faith on
administrators as implied terms of the contract. See, e.g., Booker v. Grand Rapids
Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
35. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup. Ct.),
affd mem., 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1st Dep't 1917).
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contravene the accepted doctrine which deemed it proper for federal courts to intervene when a state-supported educational institu36
tion discriminated against a student because of race or religion.
This judicial policy of nonintervention in school procedural
matters was not looked upon favorably by all those familiar with it.
The late Professor Warren A. Seavey of Harvard characterized the
courts' nonintervention as "denying to a student the [due process]
protection given to a pickpocket." 37 He argued further that the
professor-student relationship is of a fiduciary nature, and therefore
maintained that all facts relating to a disciplinary dismissal be disclosed to the student. 3 8 Within a few years after Professor Seavey
expressed this criticism, courts began to consider more seriously
the possible procedural due process rights of students. This change
from nonintervention to intervention by the courts was probably
due in part to the surge of student activism in the 1960's.
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District3 9 established
that students' constitutional rights are to be preserved in school.
In Tinker the Supreme Court ruled that the first and fourteenth
amendments prohibited school authorities from suspending students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.4 0 The
Court observed: "It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."4 1
Substantial augmentation of procedural due process guaranteed to students occurred in the area of disciplinary expulsions
from public universities. The landmark decision of Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education42 was the first major departure
from previous judicial abstention in cases involving disciplinary
36. See, e.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1959).
37. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406,
1407 (1957).
38. See id. & n.3.
39. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40. See id. at 513-14.
41. Id. at 506. For an excellent discussion of Tinker and its implications, see
Buss, supra note 30, at 554-57; Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to

School, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 35 (1969); Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends
in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 612, 615-19 (1970); Valente, Student Discipline in Public Schools Under the Constitution, 17 VILL. L. REv. 1028,
1029-39 (1972).
42. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). As Professor
Wright stated: "The opinion ... had the force of an idea whose time had come and it
has swept the field." Wright, supra note 30, at 1032.
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dismissals from postsecondary schools. Dixon readied the judiciary
for recognition that a student has a constitutional right to some
form of hearing prior to or immediately following suspension or
expulsion from school.
Dixon involved a group of students who were dismissed from a
state-supported 43 college for taking part in a civil rights demonstration. These students were not informed of the grounds for their
dismissal or given a chance to speak in their behalf.4 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that expulsion from college
eliminated possible future educational and employment opportunities; as a result, it infringed upon a student's liberty interest. 4 5
Thus, the students were entitled to due process protection prior to
dismissal. 4 6 In so ruling, the court stated for the first time that due
process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing before a
student can be expelled from a state-supported college or university for disciplinary reasons.
The Dixon court cited Justice Frankfurter's comment in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath4 7 that the precise nature of the interest involved is a paramount consideration in the
determination of what constitutes adequate due process safeguards. 48 The interest involved in Dixon was the students' completion of their college education. Because a college education today is
extremely important to a student's future, the court accepted the
argument that some form of due process protection is warranted to
avoid arbitrary actions by school authorities. 4 9
The court balanced the right of a student to continue his education against the desire of university authorities to maintain discipline free from notice and hearing requirements. 50 This balancing
was undertaken to determine the minimum procedural protections
43.

That the university involved was state-supported is important. See notes 7

& 16 supra.
44. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 154-55 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
45. See id. at 157.
46. Id. This rationale reflects the commonly held view that a college education
is a necessity today. See generally, Wright, supra note 30. The Supreme Court has
noted the values of education on many occasions. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
47. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 157.
50. See id. at 156.
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required in disciplinary dismissals from state colleges and universities. These procedures included the following: The student had to
be given the names of the witnesses against him and the facts to
which those witnesses testified; he had to have an opportunity to
present his own defense, including presentation of witnesses; and
the findings of any hearing had to be made available to him in
51
writing.
Since Dixon, lower federal courts have uniformly determined
that due process is required where a student is disciplined by a
state-supported educational institution. 52 In dicta, the Supreme
Court in Tinker echoed the Dixon standards. 53 The Court stated in
Tinker: "The decision cannot be taken as establishing that the State
may impose and enforce any conditions that it chooses upon attendance at public institutions of learning, however violative they may
be of fundamental constitutional guarantees." 5 4 The Court cited
Dixon and two other college discipline cases to support this state55
ment.
In Goss v. Lopez, 56 the Supreme Court for the first time recognized procedural due process protection in disciplinary dismissals
for all public school students. Although the facts in Goss dealt with
suspensions only from a public high school, the Supreme Court
fully sanctioned the Dixon doctrine that a student dismissed from a
public college or university was entitled to due process. According
to Goss, a public school student has two major interests: a property
interest in educational benefits, and a liberty interest in educational and employment opportunities and reputation. These interests are of paramount importance; thus, notice and a hearing are
required before the issuance of even temporary suspensions.5"
51. Id. at 158-59. The Dixon court did not hold that a "full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses" is necessary or appropriate. Id. at

159.
52. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812
(2d Cir. 1967); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See generally Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368 (1963).
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2
(1969).
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. The two other cases were Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F.
Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), and Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174
(M.D. Tenn. 1961). In addition, West Va. State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (elementary school flag salute case), was cited.
56. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
57. Id. at 576 & n.8.
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The Court employed a two-part analysis in reaching its decision. First, the Court determined that a student has a property and
a liberty interest and then, having found such interests, determined "what process [was] due." 58 The Court in Goss noted that
most property interests, such as the rights of state employees, 5 9
welfare recipients, 60 and parolees, 61 are statutory in origin. 62 According to Justice White: "Having chosen to extend the right to an
education to [students by statute] generally, Ohio may not withdraw that [property] right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct
63
has occurred."
The Court in Goss then considered the students' liberty interest. According to the Court, this interest encompasses "a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity." 64 If these are "at
stake, because of what the [state's official] is doing to him," 65 the
requirements of due process must be met. The Court concluded
that because of the central role education plays in our society and
the adverse affect a suspension has on a student's future, this loss
of property or liberty rights cannot be imposed by the state
66
through summary procedures.
Having concluded that the summary suspension procedures
used violated both the liberty and property aspects of the due
process clause, the Court outlined the balancing process to be used
to decide what process was mandated by the Constitution. That
control of the day-to-day function of the nation's school systems
must be vested in state and local authorities was not at issue.
However, the Court recognized that school systems do not operate
in a vacuum; thus, there must be minimum procedures comporting
with due process when a student is suspended or dismissed. These
minimum procedures necessitate an adjudication "preceded by

58. I. at 577 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
59. Id. at 573 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
60. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
61. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (hearing required prior
to parole revocation)).
62. Id. at 572-73 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)),
63. Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
64. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
65. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
66. See id. at 576.
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notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
67
case."
The timing and nature of the notice and hearing depend upon
the interests involved. 68 The interests to be balanced in Goss were
the right of a student not to be unfairly suspended from a public
69
school and the state's interest in maintaining order and discipline.
Both of these interests were accommodated by the Court's decision. The notice and hearing requirements set forth appeared to
the Court to be no "less than a fair-minded school principal would
impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions." 70 The
Court stated that making hearing requirements for short suspensions more formal might place an inordinate burden on school administrative facilities. It would1 thus "cost more than it would save
7
in educational effectiveness."The Court in Goss was divided five to four. It appears that the
Court diverged on the parameters of the constitutional rights of
students. 72 The minority 73 deferred to the authority of the school
administrators. The majority in Goss based its decision on the belief that individual rights extend to students in a classroom. Goss involved a ten-day suspension. The Supreme Court expressly left
open what process may be mandated for longer suspensions or expulsions and whether procedural due process requirements extend
to other areas of administrative decisions, such as exclusion from
extracurricular activities. 74 Consequently, it is advantageous to examine the lower federal court decisions in this area.
Several courts have ordered a hearing with a similar format to
that espoused in Goss, requiring notice, an explanation of the
charges, and an opportunity for the student to be heard. 75 Other
courts have indicated that something more than what is now re67. Id. at 579 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313

(1950)).
68. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).

69. See id. at 579-80.
70.

Id. at 583.

71.

Id.

72. Id. at 566, 584-600 (Powell, J., dissenting).

73. The minority Justices were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist.
74. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 597 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388,
1392-93 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
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quired by Goss is necessary. Additional elements have included the
76
right to present testimony and witnesses in a student's defense,
the right to confrontation and cross-examination, 77 and the right to
counsel. 78 Although these procedural requirements may be inordinately burdensome when dealing with short-term suspensions, they
may well be called for if a harsher penalty, such as expulsion, is at
issue.
Insofar as the extension of the Goss rationale into other areas
of school decisionmaking is concerned, Justice Powell noted in his
dissent in Goss that it is apparent that the Court will in the future
require that due process be applied to other than disciplinary suspensions and expulsions. 7 9 As Justice Powell noted, the Court
should have specified whether or not there is a rational distinction
between disciplinary procedures and these other types of decisions.8 0

Although the Dixon and Goss decisions have important ramifications for due process rights of students in disciplinary suspensions or expulsions, the courts have refused to impose similar
requirements in the area of dismissals based on academic performance. The traditional posture in this area is that courts should not
become involved in a field of decisionmaking which is the proper
domain of those with more expertise, in this case, school officials. 8 1
Thus, academic expulsion without a hearing does not violate
due process guarantees. 82 The courts will, however, review such a
dismissal when it is alleged that it was arbitrary, capricious, or in
bad faith.8 3 If this allegation is proven, the court will order the
76. See Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722, 730 (D. Neb. 1972).
77. See id.
78. See Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1074
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973).
79. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 597-99 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). These
situations can include disputes over grades or exclusion from a school's extracurricular activities. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. See id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Connelly v.
University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). To justify deferring to the expertise
of school officials in academic matters, courts note that in the nature of the educational process, teachers are more expert than students or courts in assessing academic
performance. See id.
82. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978).
83. See, e.g., Depperman v. University of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73, 76 (E.D. Ky.
1974), where the court noted t],at despite the laissez-faire stance accorded. schools in
academic matters, a decision made by school authorities in this area may be action-
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school officials to grant the student a hearing. 84 The standard for
proving that an academic dismissal was motivated by ill will or capriciousness is difficult to meet. 85 It seems that unless it can be
established that a purportedly "academic" dismissal was motivated
by nonacademic considerations, such as a teacher's personal
animosity towards the student, the courts will not interfere in university affairs.
Two circuit court cases, Gaspar v. Bruton8 6 and Greenhill v.
Bailey, 8 7 reaffirmed that courts will not intervene in academic dismissals in state-supported postsecondary schools unless such dismissals are arbitrary or capricious. The court in Greenhill ordered a
hearing because more than mere academic dismissal was involved;
the dismissal was accompanied by a letter to the American Medical
Association, claiming that Greenhill lacked the intellectual ability
to pursue medical studies. Since the effect of this additional action
was to foreclose other educational and vocational opportunities for
88
Greenhill, a hearing was ordered.
able if motivated by bad faith; Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 161
(D. Vt. 1965), where a complaint alleging that a professor in medical school decided
he would not give a student a passing grade regardless of the quality of his work was
tantamount to an allegation of bad faith, arbitrariness, and capriciousness. If proven,
these allegations justify appropriate relief; Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 104,
171 S.W.2d 822, 827-28, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942), where the court stated that
intervention is appropriate only where school official's actions have been arbitrary or
unlawful.
84. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513
F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
85. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513
F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
86. 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
87. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
88. The Greenhill court reasoned that notice and a hearing were required, as
Greenhill was being deprived of a significant liberty interest. Id. at 8. More specifically, by disparaging the student's intellect in their letter to the American Medical
Association, the school authorities were deemed to have overstepped the bounds of
an academic evaluation. See id. It is highly likely that if the chool authorities had
not communicated this evaluation of Greenhill outside the school, or if the officials
had limited their appraisal to the ability of Greenhill regarding his studies alone and
had not disparaged his intellectual ability in general, the court would not have ruled
that due process was required. Id. The fact that the Greenhill court emphasized the
public disclosure by the school of the student's alleged lack of intellectual ability
enables Greenhill to meet the standards of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In
Bishop a dismissed police officer was held not entitled to due process protection as
"it would stretch the concept of liberty too far 'to suggest that a person is deprived of
"liberty" when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to
seek another.'" Id. at 348 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575
(1972)). That the police officer's superiors had not made public the reasons for his
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The Gaspar court held that students in public, postsecondary
schools have a property right in their education.8 9 This property
right is circumscribed when nothing more than minimal notice of
dismissal is required if a student's academic performance is the sole
criterion for dismissal. Greenhill established that if a dismissal was
based upon more than a student's total academic performance, with
a resulting loss of liberty, the protection afforded by notice and a
hearing is required.90 The Greenhill decision suggests that
academic expulsion from some postsecondary schools, such as
schools of law and medicine, curtails future employment opportunities. This argument may fail to establish a property interest
because there is no guarantee of employment, even with full
academic credentials. However, as academic dismissal from a professional school may bar any opportunity for employment in that
profession, it is possible that a liberty interest can be established.
The recent decision of the Fifth Circuit in Mahavongsanan v.
Hall9 l also indicates the method by which courts deal with
academic dismissals. Plaintiff in this case claimed that her right to
due process was violated when Georgia State University denied her
a master's degree in education after she failed a comprehensive
examination twice and did not complete additional course work in
lieu of the exam. The district court ruled for plaintiff.9 2 The court
of appeals, in reversing the lower court decision, distinguished the
Dixon line of cases because they had been limited to disciplinary
dismissals. 9 3 The court distinguished due process standards in
academic dismissals from those in disciplinary dismissals: "Misconduct and failure to attain a standard of scholarship cannot be
equated. A hearing may be required to determine charges of misconduct, but a hearing may be useless or harmful in finding out the
truth concerning scholarship." 9 4
dismissal was a substantial factor in the Court's decision. Thus, there is the possibility that school officials can include a student's personal characteristics in their decision to dismiss him so long as there is no public disclosure of these characteristics.
89. See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975).
90. In Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975), the court of appeals
noted that once school officials evaluate more than a student's academic performance
by characterizing his personal traits and making this public knowledge, the student
is deprived of a significant liberty interest in his reputation and thus must be given
notice and a hearing. See id. at 8.
91. 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
92. Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1976).
93. See Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 450.
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In Horowitz the Eighth Circuit, subsequent to its decision in
Greenhill, held that a student has a liberty interest in completing

her education and that she is entitled to due process protection of
that interest. 95 In light of the foregoing, we may now examine the
Horowitz case and its implications.
THE

Horowitz DECISION

Horowitz was admitted to medical school in the fall of 1971
with advanced standing. 98 Her scores on the Graduate Record Examination and the Medical College Aptitude Test were extremely
high; her score was in the 99th percentile on the Graduate Record

Exam. She had excellent recommendations from those with whom
she had worked at the National Institute of Mental Health in
97
Bethesda, Maryland.
Dr. William Sirridge, Horowitz's docent, 98 recommended her
for advanced standing as a sixth-year-level student in a letter and
evaluation report of June 1972; 99 he found Horowitz above average

in all respects. 10 0 Less than one month later, she was advised by
the dean that she had been placed on probation. She was, however, advanced pursuant to schedule. 10

1

95. See Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98
S. Ct. 948 (1978).
96. Ms. Horowitz had a bachelor's degree from Barnard College and a master's
degree in psychology from Columbia University. She studied pharmacology at Duke
University for one year, studying the same curriculum as the first-year medical students studied there. She also attended the Women's Medical College of Pennsylvania from September 1964 to January 1965, but withdrew in good standing due to
illness in the first semester. In addition, Horowitz completed more than five years of
research in psychopharmacology at the National Institute of Mental Health in
Bethesda, Maryland. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1318 (8th Cir.
1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
97. Id. at 1318.
98. Docent is a term given to a faculty member who has frequent and close
contact with a small group of students. The docent maintains this close relationship
with the same small group of students throughout their years of instruction and directs their education. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1319 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
99. At the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School, studies are divided into rotational units. These include clinical duties as well as academic study.
During her first year of a two-year program at the medical school, approximately
equivalent to the third year in a traditional four-year school, Horowitz received credit for all six rotations. Brief for Respondent at 2-3, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S.
Ct. 948 (1978).
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
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The Dean gave the following reasons for placing Horowitz on
probation:
Your acquisition of information is good. Your relationship with
others has not been good and represents a major deficiency. You
need to improve your relationship with others rapidly and substantially. This involves keeping to established schedules; meeting all clinical responsibilities on time and gracefully; attending
carefully to personal appearance, including hand washing and
grooming; participating appropriately in the activities of the
School; and directing criticisms and suggestions maturely to your
Docent and to the faculty member who is in charge of a curriculum block as you may have criticisms and suggestions. 10 2
No mention was made of Horowitz's clinical competence.
Shortly after she received this letter, her docent wrote another
letter of recommendation dated August 10, 1972, indicating that
Horowitz had the highest class standing.103 During the following
fall, 1972, Horowitz ranked first in the school on Part I of the National Board Examination for medical students and second on Part
11.104 She ranked fourth in her class in quarterly exams given in
February 1973 and second in the May 1973 exams. 1 0 5
Horowitz was informed in January 1973 that the Council on
Evaluation 0 6 had recommended that she not graduate in May
1973.107 She was informed that if she was dissatisfied with this de102. Letter from Dean Noback to Charlotte Horowitz (July 5, 1972), quoted in
Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct.
948 (1978). This letter, sent by Dean Noback to Horowitz, was a result of the following procedure. The Council on Evaluation, a body of students and faculty, began a
series of meetings immediately prior to the Dean's sending of the letter. Horowitz
was neither informed of nor permitted to attend any of the meetings of the Council
on Evaluation which was evaluating her performance. Furthermore, she was not allowed to submit any documents or arguments in writing on her behalf. Brief for
Respondent at 3.
103. Brief for Respondent at 4.
104. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1318 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd,
98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
105. Id.
106. The Council on Evaluation is a body of students and faculty which reviews the records of students upon request. Id. at 1319.
107. Brief for Respondent at 4. Moreover, in February 1973 she was informed
in writing that the Coordinating Committee had met and accepted the recommendation of the Council on Evaluation that she not graduate. The Coordinating Committee consists solely of faculty members, and has veto power over the Council on
Evaluation's recommendations regarding students. The Dean of the Medical School,
in turn, has veto power over the recommendations of the Coordinating Committee.
Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct.
948 (1978).
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cision, she could take a set of oral and practical examinations. 1 08
This letter stated that Horowitz had to make "substantial improvement" in the areas of "clinical competence, peer and patient relations, personal hygiene and ability to accept criticism." 10 9
On May 28, 1973, the Council on Evaluation decided to dismiss Horowitz from the medical school since she had not made the
improvements deemed necessary by the Council. 110 The coordinating committee supported the Council's recommendation of dismissal, which was also upheld by the Dean of the Medical School. On
July 6, 1973 the Dean formally informed Horowitz by letter that
she had been dismissed from the University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Medicine.'

108. By letter, Horowitz elected to exercise the option of oral and practical examinations. Brief for Respondent at 5. After procedures were created for the practical
exams, Horowitz was notified that she was to be examined by seven physicians on
the faculty, none of whom had prior contact with her. Horowitz v. Board of Curators,
538 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1976), reo'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978). The seven doctors
were informed that they were to make one of the following recommendations: "a)
graduation on schedule; b) continued probation and reassessment of her status in
May 1973; c) dismissal from the medical school." Id. There was no option for further
study after May 1973. Id. Two of the physicians recommended dismissal, two recommended graduation, and two suggested probation. One doctor stated that she was
not qualified to graduate, but expressed no additional opinion. Id. The Council on
Evaluation met on May 1, 1973 and voted not to graduate Horowitz. The Coordinating Committee met a few days later and approved the Council's recommendation
that she not be allowed to graduate. Id. Horowitz was informed of this decision;
however, no mention was made of dismissal. The Council met again on May 14,
1973, and recommended that Horowitz not be allowed to reenroll unless she improved drastically. Four days later, Dean Noback of the Medical School informed
Horowitz in writing that the Council would be meeting at some time to consider
her progress. Brief for Respondent at 7.
109. Letter from the Coordinating Committee to Charlotte Horowitz (February
7, 1973), quoted in Brief for Respondent at 5.
110. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd,
98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
111. Brief for Respondent at 7. As a consequence of her dismissal, Horowitz
lost a job offer as a graduate assistant at the University of North Carolina Medical
School because it had been contingent upon her receipt of a medical degree.
Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct.
948 (1978). Horowitz, who is presently unemployed, may never be able to find employment in medicine or in a medically-related field. The testimony of Dr. Hilliard Cohen, that Horowitz had been stigmatized by her dismissal, that her dismissal
was a "significant black mark" against her name, and that she would have great difficulty finding employment in her field or obtaining admission to a medical school,
was uncontroverted at the trial. Id. at 1320 n.3. In addition, she will probably not be
admitted to another medical school. Id. The court of appeals found: "The unrefuted
evidence here establishes that Horowitz has been stigmatized by her dismissal in
such a way that she will be unable to continue her medical education, and her

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1101

Subsequently, Horowitz brought a civil rights action against
the University of Missouri-Kansas City.11 2 The action was dismissed in an unreported opinion by the federal district court,1 1 3
and Horowitz appealed.
The Eighth Circuit in Horowitz held that, because academic
dismissal from medical school has such a serious impact on the student's future by foreclosing the student's chances for employment
in the medical field, a hearing is required by the fourteenth
amendment prior to dismissal.'1 4 This aspect of the opinion was an
important extension of Greenhill v. Bailey."15 Unlike Greenhill,
where there was public disclosure of information disparaging the
student's intellectual ability, Horowitz involved a purely academic
dismissal with no public disclosure of the reasons for that dismissal.
Despite this difference between the two cases, the Eighth Circuit
found a liberty interest deprived in both instances, a determination
that was questionable in light of the Supreme Court decision in
116
Bishop v. Wood.
The court of appeals in Horowitz relied on the Supreme Court
holdings in Board of Regents v. Roth"17 and Perry v. Sindermann. 1 18 Quoting Roth, the Eighth Circuit in Horowitz stated:
"[T]he Court recognized that action of the state which 'imposed
...a stigma or other disability that foreclosed ... freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities' was a deprivation of
liberty which could not be accomplished without notice and a hearing." 1 19 The court also stated:
We are cognizant that some decisions recognize a distinction between expulsions for misconduct and academic failure .... We
express no opinion on the validity of that distinction under other
circumstances. However, our decision in [Greenhill] acknowledges "that the dictates of due process, long recognized as applichances of returning to employment in a medically related field are severely damaged." Id. at 1321.
112. Horowitz brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
113. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, No. 74CV47-W-3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 1975),
rev'd, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
114. See Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1321 (8th Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
115. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
116. 426 U.S. 341 (1976); see note 88 supra.
117. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
118. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
119. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1321 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978).
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cable to disciplinary [cases] . . . may apply in other cases as

well, %vherethe particular circumstances meet the criteria 120
articulated by the Supreme Court in [Roth] and [Sindermann]."'

In using this method of analysis, the court of appeals minimized
the academic/disciplinary dichotomy in the case law. The court focused instead on Horowitz's liberty interest in continuing her education. Horowitz would be stigmatized by the expulsion in such a
way that her future educational and employment benefits would be
severely limited; the court maintained that this represented a compelling liberty interest which could not be forfeited without a hearing.
The medical school appealed the Eighth Circuit's decision and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 1 2 1 The argument advanced
by the medical school was that Horowitz's dismissal was based on
deficient academic performance; 122 it contended that her dismissal
had no disciplinary overtones. The medical school asserted that this
is a case of first impression for the Court. 12 3 In characterizing
Horowitz's dismissal as academic rather than disciplinary, the medical school relied on the disciplinary/academic dichotomy that runs
throughout the cases in this area. If a dismissal is for academic
reasons, procedural due process need not be granted to the student;1 24 if the dismissal is for disciplinary reasons, due process is
mandatory. 125
Horowitz contended that her dismissal was not purely academic in that other than academic factors were relied upon by the
medical school in expelling her. 12 6 In addition, Horowitz argued
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121.
122.

Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
See Brief of Petitioners at 14.

123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Depperman v. University of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Ky.
1974); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Connelly v. University
of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass.
19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913); Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942). The brief of petitioners argues that the medical school
was not arbitrary or capricious in reaching its decision to dismiss Horowitz; thus,
petitioners argued that the only reason for court review of academic dismissal did not
exist in this case. See Brief of Petitioners at 22-23.
125. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382
F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281
F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
126. See Brief for Respondent at 13. Horowitz attempted to classify her dismiss-

al as disciplinary because as such, a hearing is mandated. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez,
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that even if her dismissal were academic, a hearing is required
27
because the school's decision was arbitrary and capricious.'
Horowitz reasoned that a number of lower courts have declared that
academic dismissals from state educational institutions can be enjoined if arbitrary or capricious. 12 8 Another argument Horowitz advanced was similar to the rationale espoused in Greenhill v.
Bailey. 12 9 Horowitz maintained that since her liberty interest had
been violated by the foreclosure of her future educational and
career opportunities,
procedural due process protections were warranted. 13 0
In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 131 the Supreme Court
categorized Horowitz's dismissal as academic.' 32 Horowitz was thus
a case of first impression for the Court; the Court had to determine
whether to extend the procedural protection guaranteed in disciplinary dismissals to academic expulsions.
In a unanimous decision, 133 the Court held that Horowitz had
been given "at least as much" due process protection as mandated
by the fourteenth amendment.' 34 The Court noted: "The School
fully informed respondent [Horowitz] of the faculty's dissatisfaction
with her clinical progress and the danger that this posed to timely
graduation and continued enrollment. The ultimate decision to
dismiss respondent was careful and deliberate. These procedures
were sufficient under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 13 5 The Court also held that dismissals for academic
reasons do not mandate a hearing before the school's decisionmak-

419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
127.

See Brief for Respondent at 11-12.

128. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
129. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
130. See Brief for Respondent at 12. This argument is also based on language in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
131. 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978).
132. See id. at 950.
133. Although all of the Justices concurred in the reversal, four of the justices,
Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun declined to join in the Court's
opinion which was written by Justice Rehnquist. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in
filing an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. See Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978).
134. See id. at 952.
135. Id.
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ing body. 13 6 In addition, the Court ruled that there was no need to
remand to the court of appeals for consideration of her substantive
due process claim. 137
The Court began its analysis by discussing the liberty and
property interests involved: To be entitled to procedural due process protection under the fourteenth amendment, there must be at
least one of these interests that has been deprived through the
state. In Goss v. Lopez, 138 the Court noted that the high school
students involved had a property right in their education because it
was a right granted by statute.' 3 9 The Court in Goss asserted that
the State of Ohio, once having granted this property right in education to high school students, could not then withdraw this right
without due process of law. 140 In Horowitz no such statutory right
to a medical education existed. The Court stated: "Because property interests are creatures of state law . . . [Horowitz] would have
been required to show at trial that her seat at the Medical School
14 1
was a "property" interest recognized by Missouri state law."'
Thus, the Court observed that it would have been difficult for
Horowitz to prove that she had a property interest in her education
at the medical school.
The Court then analyzed Horowitz's contention that she possessed a liberty interest. Horowitz argued that her dismissal deprived her of liberty by substantially impairing her medical educational and employment opportunities. The Court analogized her
contention to that of petitioner in Bishop v. Wood.1 42 In Bishop
the Court upheld the dismissal of a policeman without a hearing.
The mere fact of dismissal, without public disclosure of the reasons
predicating it, was held not to constitute a stigma infringing upon
one's liberty since the person's interest in his "good name, honor,
or integrity" is not impaired by it. 14 3 That is, if the reasons for
dismissal were not made public, petitioner, although perhaps in a
less desirable position regarding employment opportunities, was
136.

See id. at 955.

137. See id. at 956. The Court noted: "[A] number of lower courts have implied
in dictum that academic dismissals from state institutions can be enjoined if 'shown
to be clearly arbitrary or capricious' . . . . [Wie agree with the District Court that no

showing
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

of arbitrariness or capriciousness has been made in this case." Id.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
See id. at 572-74.
See id.
98 S. Ct. 948, 951 (1978).
426 U.S. 341 (1976).
Id. at 348. See note 88 supra.
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still free to search for employment without the weight of a debilitating stigma.
The court of appeals in Horowitz did not mention Bishop. Although the same court found relevant that disclosure was made of
1 44
the reasons behind an academic dismissal in Greenhill v. Bailey,
it apparently believed that Horowitz presented a factual situation
compelling enough to warrant no consideration of the disclosure
issue. Greenhill's ruling, that due process is warranted in an
academic dismissal, was greatly influenced by the fact that information denigrating the student's intellectual ability had been publicly
disclosed. The Eighth Circuit in Horowitz should have focused on
this issue in light of its decision in Greenhill and the Supreme
Court decision in Bishop v. Wood. 145 Instead, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that because academic dismissal from a state medical
school effectively foreclosed Horowitz's medical educational and
employment opportunities, she had a liberty interest in completing
her education that warranted due process protection. 146
Although the Supreme Court indicated that a state university
does not deprive a student of a liberty interest when it dismisses
her without public disclosure of the reasons for the dismissal, it explicitly declined to resolve this issue. Rather, the Court assumed
that both a property and a liberty interest existed and held that
Horowitz had been granted "at least as much due process as the
Fourteenth Amendment requires.' 147 Having reached this conclusion, it was unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the
constitutional treatment accorded academic dismissals could be
different from that accorded disciplinary dismissals. Whatever the
minimum protection is for academic dismissals, the treatment she
received was found to be more than adequate under the standards
set forth in Goss v. Lopez. 148 Having decided this, the Court went
one step too far in categorizing Horowitz's dismissal as academic.
It went beyond the facts of the case, inappropriately holding that
no hearing of any kind nor any opportunity to respond is mandated
in an academic dismissal. Once having dealt with this issue, the
minimum protection the Court should have required for an aca-

144. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
145.

146.
rev'd, 98
147.
148.

426 U.S. 341 (1976).

See Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1321 (8th Cir. 1976),
S.Ct. 948 (1978).
98 S.Ct. 948, 952 (1978).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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demic dismissal was notice of the reasons for the dismissal and
an opportunity for the student to present her side of the story. This
would not have imposed an inordinate burden on academic officials
149
as the Court suggests it would have.
When Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that
academic evaluation of students is not subject to the hearing and
review used to judge the fairness of a disciplinary suspension or
dismissal, he relied upon the academic/disciplinary dichotomy in
prior rulings in this area.' 50 In determining that academic expulsions do not require the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due
process, the Court distinguished the Dixon line of cases,' 5 ' and
Goss. i 52 The Court characterized these cases, which deal with disciplinary suspensions and dismissals of public school students, as
adopting the traditional view that, while disciplinary action is sufficiently similar to traditional judicial and administrative factfinding
to demand a hearing before the school authorities, academic dismissals are not.' 53 The Court relied on the long-standing view of
the lower courts that academic decisions, such as what constitutes a
passing grade, are within the realm of the academic community
alone; a court is not equipped with the expertise which is needed
for a hearing.' 5 4 The Supreme Court thus sanctioned for the first
time what the lower courts had held for over sixty years: When a
student is dismissed in an academic proceeding, he is not entitled
to procedural due process protection.
The Court, however, failed to provide adequate guidelines for
ascertaining what constitutes an academic as opposed to a disciplinary dismissal. Disciplinary dismissals usually involve activities
such as causing a major disruption by instigating a fight; academic
dismissals usually involve a school's grading system. The Horowitz
case, however, may be said to fall into the gray area between the
academic/disciplinary distinction. Horowitz was found to be defi-

149.

See 98 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1978).

150. See id. at 953-55.
151. Id. at 954 n.4.
152.

Id. at 954-55.

153. See id. at 954-55. The Court stated in pertinent part: "Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance
to the judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full hearing requirement." Id. at 955.
154. See, e.g., Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975); Mustell v. Rose,
282 Ala. 358, 367, 211 So. 2d 489, 498, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Barnard v.
Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
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cient in her grooming, clinical competence, and peer and patient
relations. These are areas which she contended were "overwhelmingly conduct-related" and hence patently disciplinary.1 5 5 On the
other hand, the medical school argued that these very deficiencies,
although behavioral, were essentially requirements of a course:
Since Horowitz had failed to fulfill the course's requirements, she
was dismissed for academic deficiencies. 156 The Court should have
attempted to delineate precisely the elements involved in classifying a dismissal as academic or disciplinary so as to facilitate the
determination of whether or not a student is entitled to due process protection. In so doing, the Court would have minimized the
possibility of future inconsistent verdicts in dismissals predicated
upon a combination of academic and disciplinary factors.
In separate opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
three Justices 15 7 contended that the Court's opinion constituted a
reduction of the due process rights of public school students where
the facts did not require any such determination.1 58 The Court determined at the outset that Horowitz had received more than what
was required by the fourteenth amendment regarding due process
protection. As mentioned earlier, this holding should have sufficed
as the definitive ruling; the Court' should not have proceeded on
any other issue. As Justice Marshall noted:
This case simply provides no legitimate opportunity to consider
whether 'far less stringent procedural requirements,' . . . than
those required in Goss are appropriate in other school contexts.
While I disagree with the Court's conclusion that "far less" is
adequate, . . . it is equally disturbing that the Court decides an
issue not presented by the case before us.159
It appears that the Court took advantage of the Horowitz case
to manufacture an opportunity to limit the procedural protection
guaranteed by Goss to public school students. The Court has thus
narrowed the parameters of due process protection that had been

155. See Brief for Respondent at 13.
156. See Brief of Petitioners at 26.
157. The three were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. It is of interest
to note that Justice Marshall was an attorney for the dismissed students in the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
158. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948, 959, 964 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., and Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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widened in Goss; although students are still guaranteed procedural
protection regarding disciplinary dismissals, they are not entitled to
this protection if their dismissal is categorized as academic.
Justice Marshall questioned the Court's adherence to the idea
of an academic/disciplinary dichotomy: "[T]he effort to apply such
labels does little to advance the due process inquiry, as is indicated
by an examination of the facts of this case."' 160 Horowitz, Justice
Marshall stated, was dismissed largely because of her conduct, as
were the students in Goss.' 6 ' Justice Marshall commented that
rather than employ categories such as "academic" and "disciplinary," the Court should have paid attention to whether or not the
16 2
facts in dispute are conducive to determination by third parties;
in Horowitz the facts in dispute concerned her personal hygiene
and peer and patient relations.
Justice Marshall's analysis is sound. Rather than trying to ascertain whether a student's dismissal was motivated by purely academic or disciplinary considerations, the Court should focus on
whether or not a hearing would be useful based on the facts of the
case. A hearing may be of little use if a court were to intervene
regarding whether a student deserved an "A" or an "F" on a school
examination. An issue of this type is not conducive to resolution by
an outside person: It is within the expertise of the professor. If a
student is dismissed, however, because of allegations that he instigated a disruption, a hearing would be enlightening. This situation
lends itself to determination by third parties: No specific expertise
is required. Although the foregoing situations may be readily
categorized as either academic or disciplinary, problems as to
classification do arise when the facts at issue are not clearly
academic or disciplinary in nature. The Horowitz case is a good
example of this; while her dismissal was categorized at the outset
by the Court as purely for academic reasons, the facts of the case
show that numerous disciplinary considerations were involved in
the school's decision. Thus, in Horowitz the Court was faced with
an ambiguous situation; rather than relying on the black and white
labels of academic and disciplinary, the Court should have stressed
the functional considerations of the case.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 962 (Marshall, J.,
161. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. See id. at 963 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall believed that the facts in Horowitz were clearly capable of adjudication
by third parties. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160.
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Justice Marshall also contended that the Court failed to
analyze the case within the framework derived from its traditional
approach to these problems. 163 The Court did not adhere to the
64
balancing process outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; [should be balanced against] . . . the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the 1additional
or substitute procedural requirement would en65
tail.

As the Court recognized, the private interest involved is great:
"[T]he deprivation to which respondent was subjected-dismissal
from a graduate medical school-was more severe than the 10-day
suspension to which the high school students were subjected in
Goss."'166 Thus, according to Justice Marshall, the "private interest
that will be affected" 16 7 was substantial in Horowitz.
Another factor involved in the Mathews balancing test, the
"risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,"' 68 should have
been crucial in that the evaluation of Horowitz's personal hygiene
and patient and peer relations was subjective and the dean relied
heavily on the evidence of others in his decision. In addition, "the
Government's interest"' 69 should have been less important; the
university had no greater interest in summary proceeding here
0
than did the school in Goss.17
Had it analyzed Horowitz according to the Mathews standard,
the Court may not have concluded that a student in Horowitz's
position is entitled to a lower level of procedural protection than is
a student in Goss' position.171
Dissenting in part, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun
163. See id. at 960 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
165. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948, 960 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
166. Id. at 953 n.3.
167. Id. at 960 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 961 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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called for a remand to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
on the substantive due process issue to consider whether or not the
172
medical school had followed its own rules in expelling Horowitz.
One rationale for these justices' opinions was that the court of appeals had never resolved this issue. As Justice Marshall stated:
"Not only would a remand give us the benefit of the lower court's
thoughts, it would also allow us to maintain consistency with our
own Rule 23.1(c), which states that '[o]nly the questions set forth
in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by
the court.' "173
CONCLUSION

It is clear that Horowitz is of great importance. Wholesale denial of procedural due process protection to public school students
dismissed for academic reasons was sanctioned by the Supreme
Court for the first time. The Court relied on the traditional "hands
off" approach of the lower federal courts with respect to academic
dismissals; however, it failed to provide adequate guidelines for the
lower courts as to what constitutes an academic as opposed to a
disciplinary expulsion. A holding that denies a hearing where the
facts in dispute are not conducive to determination by third parties, for example concerning a grade assigned to a student, is reasonable. The question remaining is where the line should be drawn
in an ambiguous situation, one where the cause for dismissal is not
clearly disciplinary or academic.
As Justice Marshall noted, the appeal procedure of the school
was adequate to resolve whether Horowitz would have been a good
physician. 1 74 Justice Marshall asserted:
It matters not at all whether the result of such [an appeal procedure] is labeled "an 'academic' judgment," so long as it is recognized that the school authorities ...were constitutionally required to give respondent a chance to invoke the procedure, as
172. See id. at 964 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
965 (Blackmun, J., & Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Like his
colleagues, Justice White agreed with the result of the Court's opinion, but objected
to the conclusion that "no hearing of any kind or any opportunity to respond is required" in cases of "academic dismissal." Id. at 958 (White, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). See note 10 supra for a discussion of the distinction
between substantive and procedural due process.
173. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948, 964 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
174. See id.at 961 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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they did, before depriving her of a substantial liberty or property

interest. 175

Although the Court did not adhere to this position, an effort should
have been made, as Justice Marshall suggested, "to find procedures
that are fair to the student and the school, and that promote the
elusive goal of determining the truth in a manner consistent with
both individual dignity and society's limited resources." 1 76 The
Horowitz decision will have a substantial impact on every graduate
and professional school in the nation, 17 7 as well as on lower courts
forced to grapple with Horowitz's vague fairness standard, which
characterizes dismissals as either academic or disciplinary.
Abigail I. Petersen
175. Id. at 963 n.18 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
176. Id. at 963 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1977, at 40, col. 1.
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